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Introduction
On 13 February 2016, news broke that Supreme Court 
Associate Justice Antonin Scalia had passed away follow-
ing an afternoon of quail hunting at the Cibolo Creek Ranch 
in Texas. On that very same day, even before flags nation-
wide could be lowered to half-staff, the Senate Majority 
Leader, Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, released a written 
statement announcing that the Senate would not act on any 
nomination by President Barack Obama. “This vacancy 
should not be filled until we have a new president,” the 
Republican senator declared.
McConnell’s resolve is being tested by Obama’s nomi-
nation of Merrick Garland, but McConnell’s threatened 
exercise of negative agenda power aims to preserve 
Republican Party cohesion. Nominating an extremely 
qualified and ideologically moderate nominee might 
drive a wedge between the conservative and moderate 
clusters of Republican senators. Senators facing difficult 
re-election battles might be tempted to defect from the 
party position if forced to vote, and so obstructing the 
confirmation process shields these senators from a con-
troversial choice.
A strategic explanation for McConnell’s actions, such as 
the one in the last paragraph, depends on an implicit theory 
of how senators decide whether to support or oppose a 
Supreme Court nominee. This paper uses one such theory 
to forecast current senators’ votes on Merrick Garland’s 
nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court, in the unlikely case 
that a vote actually takes place. The forecasts are necessar-
ily conditional, awaiting measurement of the nominee’s 
characteristics, particularly his ideological reputation and 
perceived qualifications. Nonetheless, a model that com-
bines parameters estimated from existing data with values 
of some measurable characteristics of senators—particu-
larly their party affiliations, party loyalty levels, and ideo-
logical “ideal points”—is sufficient to identify potential 
swing voters in the Senate.
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Models of senators’ confirmation 
voting behavior
Empirical studies of Supreme Court confirmation votes 
have focused on explaining both confirmation outcomes 
(cf. Segal, 1987; Segal and Spaeth, 2002) and senators’ 
votes on nominees (cf. Cameron et al., 1990; Epstein et al., 
2006; Segal et al., 1992). Let us consider two simplistic 
models of senators’ confirmation voting behavior and one 
more complicated model. We begin by describing each 
model, then show how it performs on explaining senators’ 
voting behavior between the administrations of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and George W. Bush. Comparing the three mod-
els’ performance at predicting senators’ voting behavior for 
Barack Obama’s first two nominees, Sonia Sotomayor and 
Elena Kagan, reveals how the nominating process has 
become more partisan, so that models that pay insufficient 
attention to partisanship fit the current political environ-
ment poorly.
First, the “deferential” model would emphasize the una-
nimity that historically characterized the constitutional 
Advice and Consent process. From Hugo Black in 1937 to 
Thurgood Marshal in 1967, 22 consecutive nominees were 
confirmed by the Senate.1 Senators cast 1906 yea votes in 
total, versus just 83 nay votes; the average nominee received 
96% of senators’ support. Over the long run the deferential 
model was highly successful. From 1937 through 2007, a 
period covering 12 presidents and 41 nominations, the def-
erential model correctly predicted 87.2% of votes.
Second, the “partisan” model would emphasize whether 
an individual senator shares the president’s party affilia-
tion. Over the 70-year span from 1937 to 2007, the partisan 
model would have been successful on fewer than 63.9% of 
senators’ votes.
Third, the “Segal” model has four explanatory varia-
bles: the president’s political strength, meaning that his 
party holds a majority of seats in the Senate and that it is 
not an election year; each senator’s party affiliation in rela-
tion to the president;2 the nominee’s reputation in terms of 
qualifications;3 and the proximity of each senator’s ideo-
logical position to the nominee’s reputed perceived ideol-
ogy.4 These four variables plus an interaction between 
ideological proximity and qualifications form a model that 
would have been successful on 90.2% of votes on nomi-
nees between 1937 and 2007.
So far, we have described the relative accuracy of these 
three models in terms of in-sample validation, i.e. referring 
back to the votes that were used to generate the model’s 
parameters. A recent perspective holds that we should use 
out-of-sample validation5 to judge models. King and Zeng 
state, “We must regard models that make causal inferences 
as also capable of forecasting. … Scholars would do well to 
judge all models in terms of their forecasting prowess, 
regardless of the purpose for which they were originally 
developed” (2001: 634). An example of out-of-sample 
validation would be assessing how well each model would 
fare at predicting senators’ votes on future nominees.
The deferential model and Segal model fared surprisingly 
poorly in forecasting senators’ votes during the confirma-
tions of Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. Both nominees 
were portrayed in the media as highly qualified, and Obama 
was a “strong” president, as Democrats held the Senate’s 
majority. If one used all nominees from Black through Alito 
to estimate the parameters of the Segal model, and then used 
those parameters to generate forecasts of votes on Sotomayor 
and Kagan, the prediction would have been near unanimous 
support among Republicans. In reality, 31 of 99 senators 
opposed Sotomayor’s confirmation and 37 of 100 senators 
opposed Kagan’s confirmation. Forecasting strict party-line 
voting would have correctly predicted 92.5% of senators’ 
votes on Obama’s nominees, compared to just 65.5% for the 
deferential model and 67.8% for the Segal model.6
When examining political phenomena that take place over 
long spans of time, models must account for dynamics: “The 
only way that forecasts can remain accurate far into the future 
is if the causal structure giving rise to the data remain stable” 
(King and Zeng, 2001: 634). A comparison of in-sample and 
out-of-sample predictions suggests that consideration of 
Supreme Court nominees has switched from a regime in 
which the president’s nominee is presumed worthy of confir-
mation unless his or her reputation or ideological position 
undermines that presumption, to a regime in which voting is 
largely based on party considerations. Our challenges are to 
explain the transition over time and to use that knowledge to 
predict behavior on current and future nominees.
The partisan dynamic
Two recent articles on Supreme Court confirmations rec-
ognized the increased role of partisanship on senators’ 
votes. Shipan (2008) noted that while senators in the pres-
ident’s party have always been more likely to support 
nominees than senators in the opposing party, the gap 
widened from less than 10% between Presidents Kennedy 
and Ford, to nearly 20% when Reagan took office, and 
then continued to grow. Shipan used a counter variable to 
estimate the changing importance of party considerations, 
so his model can be extrapolated indefinitely, but ulti-
mately his analysis does not identify a theory of precisely 
why partisanship has become more relevant to Supreme 
Court confirmation voting.
Basinger and Mak (2012) argued that party cohesion 
provides both a theoretical link missing from Shipan’s 
approach and an empirical measure of how important parti-
san considerations are to senators.7 Legislative parties’ 
cohesion and partisanship in the electorate tend to be in 
equilibrium: as parties’ brand names become more mean-
ingful cues for voters, reinforcing those brand names 
becomes more imperative to legislators. As party cohesion 
rises, senators who belong to the president’s party should 
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be more likely to rally around the president’s nominees, 
while senators who belong to the opposing party should be 
increasingly likely to oppose nominees. Thus, rising levels 
of average party cohesion explain the transition over time 
from a deferential regime to a partisan regime.
Basinger and Mak (2012) also theorized that variations 
within each party should be influenced by individual sena-
tors’ levels of party loyalty. Members of each party who are 
more loyal than average will be more likely to adhere to 
their party’s position, while “maverick” or independent-
minded senators will be more likely to defect. The most 
loyal senators in the president’s party are most likely to 
support the president’s nominee, and the most loyal sena-
tors in the opposing party are least likely to support the 
nominee, all else being held equal.
Average party loyalty in a Congress and relative party 
loyalty (measured as the deviation from the average in that 
Congress) can be incorporated into empirical models as a 
multiplicative interaction. We include each term separately 
and in interaction with a dummy variable indicating 
whether the senator shares the president’s party affiliation 
or belongs to the opposition party.
To estimate the parameters of the party loyalty model, we 
used all nominations in the dataset, from Hugo Black 
through Elena Kagan, and utilized a probit regression model. 
The party loyalty model’s estimated coefficients and stand-
ard errors are shown in the second column of Table 1; for 
comparison purposes, we also provide the Segal model esti-
mates in the first column of Table 1. A positive coefficient 
indicates that an increase in a variable’s value makes a yea 
vote more likely, while a negative coefficient indicates the 
opposing effect. Using either model, a senator was signifi-
cantly more likely to vote for the nominee when 
the president was in a strong political position and as the 
nominee’s qualifications rose, and a senator was signifi-
cantly less likely to vote for the nominee when the president 
belonged to the other political party and as the nominee was 
reputed to be further away in ideological space.
The party loyalty model adds two variables plus two 
interaction terms: average party loyalty8 and relative party 
loyalty9 are included by themselves and as interactions with 
the opposing-party variable. The positive coefficient for 
average party loyalty indicates that the likelihood of the 
same-party senators supporting the president’s nominee 
increases as the level of party unity rises. When we take 
into account the interaction term (average party unity × 
opposing party), the likelihood of opposition party mem-
bers voting for the nominee decreases as the level of party 
unity rises. Thus, increasing cohesion leads to a widening 
gap between “typical” members of two parties. Similar cal-
culations can be carried out for relative party loyalty: more 
loyal members of the president’s party are more likely to 
support nominees while more loyal members of the oppos-
ing party are less likely to support nominees, all else equal.
The party loyalty model out-performs the Segal model 
according to several measures of in-sample performance. The 
party loyalty model predicts more senators’ votes correctly, 
by a margin of nearly 93% versus 89%. Since the null model 
classifies 86.2% correctly, the party loyalty model eliminates 
more than twice as many erroneous classifications.
In the section titled “Models of senators’ confirmation 
voting behavior,” we performed an out-of-sample analysis 
of model fit to augment the in-sample analysis. We can 
duplicate that analysis by using just the votes for Black 
through Alito to estimate model parameters. The Segal 
model’s in-sample correct classification statistic is 90.2%, 
Table 1. Competing models of Supreme Court confirmation votes.
Segal model Party loyalty model
Constant 2.172 (.081) 2.674 (.156)
Strong president 0.354 (.062) 0.967 (.089)
Lack of qualifications –1.012 (.165) –1.508 (.226)
Ideological distance –1.186 (.155) –1.365 (.210)
Lack of qualifications × ideological distance –4.926 (.667) –4.508 (.660)
Opposing party –0.681 (.070) –1.168 (.131)
Average party loyalty 0.090 (.033)
Average party loyalty × opposing party –0.235 (.034)
Relative party loyalty 0.034 (.003)
Relative party loyalty × opposing party –0.045 (.005)
Pseudo R2 0.3636 0.5223
% correctly classified 89.1 % 92.7 %
% reduction in errors 21.1 % 47.6%
AIC 2059.682 1554.54
BIC 2097.446 1617.463
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion. 
Note: Cell entries are probit coefficient (standard error).
Every coefficient is statistically significant at p < .01 (two-tailed).
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compared to 92.6% for the party loyalty model. When these 
model parameters were applied to predict votes on 
Sotomayor and Kagan, the Segal model’s out-of-sample 
correct classification statistic is 67.8% of votes, compared 
to 94.0% for the party loyalty model.
To substantiate the predictive superiority of a model 
which incorporates the changing importance of partisan 
considerations in Senate voting, we generated out-of-sam-
ple forecasts for every nominee in the dataset using both the 
Segal model and the party loyalty model. Figure 1 plots the 
percent of incorrect predictions for each model. The two 
track quite closely from Black through Breyer. After 
Breyer’s confirmation vote in August 1994 (by an 87–9 
margin), there was an 11-year gap until Justice Roberts was 
confirmed in September 2005 (by a 78–22 margin). One 
can clearly see that the Segal model begins to deviate from 
the party loyalty model, with a far higher error rate for the 
former, for the four most recent nominees.
In summary, incorporating the average level of Senate 
parties’ cohesion and the relative loyalty of individual sena-
tors allows for more accurate predictions of senators’ votes 
in-sample as well as out-of-sample. In what follows, we 
will apply the party loyalty model to forecasting senators’ 
votes on the current nominee, Merrick Garland.
The known and the unknown
When generating forecasts, scholars rely on a few known 
elements, and then make educated guesses to fill in 
unknown elements. Senators’ party affiliations are known 
when the election is final, and rarely change mid-session; 
James Jeffords of Vermont and Arlen Spector of 
Pennsylvania provide notable recent exceptions. Because 
senators’ party affiliations are known and rarely change, 
aggregate party affiliations can be computed, allowing the 
president’s strength to be filled in; James Jeffords again 
provides the notable exception.
The characteristics of individual senators, other than 
their party affiliations, are also unknown but also can be 
estimated. Ideological positions can be estimated using the 
past voting behavior of individual senators (see Poole and 
Rosenthal, 1997, 2007). We follow Basinger and Mak 
(2012), who used the Common Space DW-NOMINATE 
scores, which are estimates of a single ideal point for each 
member of Congress for his or her entire record of service 
in Congress, and which are updated weekly. The model’s 
population parameters are unknown but can be estimated 
using existing data.
Historically, individual senators’ party loyalty levels 
were not calculated until the end of a Congress, but 
Congressional Quarterly provided us with party loyalty 
scores based on the 2015 term of the 114th Congress.10 
Loyalty scores are calculated as the percent of the time that 
senators joined their party majority on so-called “party 
unity votes,” which are roll call votes on which majorities 
of the two parties are on opposite sides.
Although Obama’s nominee is known, Merrick 
Garland’s salient characteristics have not yet been 
Figure 1. Comparison of out-of-sample forecast errors.
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measured. Segal and Cover (1989) pioneered the practice 
of measuring nominees’ qualifications and ideological 
position using newspaper editorials. Faced with incomplete 
data, we can still make educated guesses and consider vari-
ous alternative scenarios.
Conditional forecasts
Our forecast of senators’ votes are conditional statements, 
of the form, “Suppose the nominee has qualifications Q 
and ideological position N; then a senator with party affili-
ation P, party loyalty level L, and ideological position S 
will vote for the nominee with probability Y, given the 
president’s strength and the contemporaneous level of 
party cohesion (L).” Party affiliations for each senator (Pi) 
are known; we assign values of ideological position (Si) 
using Common Space first-dimension DW-NOMINATE 
scores; we assign each senator’s party loyalty level (Li) 
using scores for 2015; we calculate the average level of 
party cohesion ( L  = 91.9) and then calculate each sena-
tor’s relative loyalty as Li – L;  we set the value of presi-
dential strength equal to 0, since Democrats hold the 
minority of seats in the Senate. We used the party loyalty 
model to estimate the model’s parameters.11 In order to 
compute Y, we need only insert values of Q and N.
As an illustration, consider two senators, the most con-
servative Democrat, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, and the 
most liberal Republican, Susan Collins of Maine. These 
senators’ Common Space DW-NOMINATE scores are –.07 
and +.10, respectively, and their party loyalty levels are 
both 63%, far below the average in the first term of the 
114th Congress.
Suppose Merrick Garland’s qualifications are per-
ceived as being as high as those of John Roberts (Q = .97). 
If Garland’s ideological position was reputed to be at 
Obama’s own ideal point (N = −.366 according to a recent 
estimate by Lewis et al. (2016)), then one would calculate 
the squared distance between that point and each senator’s 
ideal point, and insert that value into the equation, and use 
the standard normal cumulative distribution to generate a 
predicted probability. Manchin’s probability of support-
ing a nominee with qualifications equal to Roberts and 
Obama’s ideal point is 99.7%, while Collins’ predicted 
probability is about 29.1%.
Perhaps it is unrealistic to anticipate that Obama would 
select an extremely liberal nominee when the opposing 
party controls the Senate. Moraski and Shipan (1999) theo-
rized that the president and Senate would perceive that any 
new appointment to the Supreme Court would move the 
median justice; with eight sitting Justices, the feasible 
range of the new median is between the 4th nominee (pres-
ently Breyer, at N = +.007) and the 5th nominee (presently 
Kennedy, at N = +.106). Moraski and Shipan (1999) refer to 
the current situation as a “Fully Constrained President,” 
since the median senator’s ideal point, recently estimated at 
+.275, is on the opposite side of the Supreme Court median 
from the president. If Obama nominated someone whose 
ideological position was reputed to be identical to 
Kennedy’s ideal point – which was the median prior to 
Justice Scalia’s death – then Sen. Manchin’s probability of 
supporting such a nominee increases marginally from 
99.7% to 99.8%, while Sen. Collins’s probability increases 
from 28.9% to about 40.9%.
For a wider set of senators, Table 2 shows the names, 
Common Space scores, and party loyalty levels of the five 
most conservative Democrats and the 17 most liberal 
Republicans in the Senate. An asterisk after the name indi-
cates that the senator is up for re-election in 2016, a condi-
tion which applies to 10 Republican senators shown in the 
Table. Table 2 then shows the predicted probabilities of 
supporting a hypothetical nominee with impeccable cre-
dentials and three different ideological positions: at 
President Obama’s ideal point, at Justice Kennedy’s ideal 
point, and at the median senator’s ideal point. Notice the 
absence of probabilities above 50% among Republican 
senators in any of the three conditions. Interestingly, our 
model’s predictions shown in the middle column directly 
contradict the expectation stated by Cameron and Kastellec: 
“Obama should nominate the best confirmable nominee — 
a Kennedy clone… — whom the Senate would approve.”
Figure 2 amplifies the seeming hopelessness of the 
nomination by showing the predicted probabilities of all 
current Republican senators voting for clones of two sit-
ting Justices – Sonia Sotomayor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
– if they, instead of Merrick Garland, had been nominated 
by President Obama during the year 2016. Senators are 
ordered by their ideological position, from liberal (left) to 
conservative (right). The graphs of predicted probabilities 
are not monotonically decreasing because the predictions 
also take into account relative party loyalty, which is only 
modestly correlated to ideological extremity. The figure 
also includes 95% confidence intervals around the pre-
dicted probabilities.
Sonia Sotomayor would not gain much Republican sup-
port in the 114th Congress; just nine Republican senators 
voted for her when she was confirmed in 2009, although 
that includes Susan Collins, Lamar Alexander, and Lindsey 
Graham. Perhaps more surprisingly, Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
would not gain much Republican support in the 114th 
Congress either, despite the fact that in 1993 she earned the 
support of 40 out of 43 Republicans, including Charles 
Grassley, Orren Hatch, John McCain, and Mitch McConnell. 
Figure 2 shows that a Ginsburg clone would be more likely 
to receive support from moderate Republican senators than 
a Sotomayor clone, due to her higher qualifications and less 
liberal reputation, yet the president’s partisan label is so 
important in the present regime that no Republican senator 
is predicted to vote for any Obama nominee. Indeed, if we 
extrapolated the analysis to imagine Obama hypothetically 
nominating a clone of Stephen Breyer, Anthony Kennedy, 
6 Research and Politics 
Figure 2. Republican senators’ predicted probabilities of voting for hypothetical nominees.
Table 2. Selected senators’ ideological positions, party loyalty levels, and predicted votes.














Carper (D) −.178 87 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 %
Heitkamp (D) −.170 71 99.9  99.9 99.8
McCaskill (D) −.150 78 100.0 100.0 99.9
Donnelly (D) −.124 72 99.9  99.9 99.8
Manchin (D) −.070 63 99.7  99.8 99.7
Collins (R)  .100 63 28.9  40.9 39.1
Murkowski* (R)  .203 78 18.9  34.0 34.2
Capito (R)  .259 87 14.0  29.7 30.9
Kirk* (R)  .275 70 17.8  36.3 37.9
Cochran (R)  .286 90 12.2  28.1 29.7
Alexander (R)  .325 84 12.0  29.6 32.0
Grassley* (R)  .341 96 8.9  24.8 27.3
Hoeven* (R)  .343 94 9.2  25.5 28.0
Ayotte* (R)  .356 74 12.9  32.7 35.8
Coats* (R)  .372 94 8.2  24.8 27.7
Portman* (R)  .378 84 9.8  28.3 31.5
McCain* (R)  .379 90 8.7  26.0 29.2
Wicker (R)  .380 96 7.7  23.9 26.9
Corker (R)  .385 88 8.8  26.6 29.9
Hatch (R)  .386 90 8.5  25.8 29.1
Boozman* (R)  .404 99 6.5  22.2 25.6
Moran* (R)  .405 92 7.5  24.6 28.1
*denotes Republican senator whose seat is up for election in 2016.
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or even Chief Justice John Roberts, our model still predicts 
zero Republican votes in favor of the nominee during the 
114th Congress.12
Discussion and conclusions
With Antonin Scalia’s passing, President Obama was pre-
sented with an opportunity to name a third Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court. The Segal model theorizes 
that ideological distance and qualifications are the primary 
determinants of senators’ votes on Supreme Court nomi-
nees, and so by naming a moderate and exceptionally well 
qualified nominee, Obama could attract sufficient 
Republican votes to guarantee confirmation. This expecta-
tion is naïve given the current politics. With the Senate’s 
present composition, a successful confirmation requires 
that there be zero Democratic defections, and at least four 
Republicans plus two Independents must support the nom-
inee. With partisan cohesion in the Senate at unprecedent-
edly high levels, Obama faces little risk of losing any 
Democratic votes, but gaining Republican votes seems 
unlikely, no matter how much political capital13 the 
President spends on the nominee.
By accounting for a more nuanced and refined under-
standing of the confirmation process, the party loyalty 
model reveals that any candidate that President Obama 
could select, whether liberal, conservative, or moderate, 
would be rejected if a vote was allowed to take place. So 
why nominate anyone at all?
Our model of senators’ political calculus incorporates 
the nominee’s qualifications and ideology, the president’s 
political strength, the Senate’s partisan environment, and 
each senator’s party loyalty and ideological position. What 
is missing from the political calculus is the senator’s beliefs 
about the election, including their own prospects for re-
election, their party’s prospects of holding the Senate 
majority after the election, and their presidential candi-
date’s prospects for victory. So few nominations take place 
during the election year that it would be infeasible to incor-
porate electoral effects into the empirical model. For now, 
these factors must remain part of the disturbance term – i.e. 
factors that affect the probability of voting for the nominee 
that are unmeasured and/or idiosyncratic.14 The results we 
computed in Table 2 and Figure 2 capture the systematic 
component of the data; Obama’s hope for a successful con-
firmation must come from the stochastic component, that 
is, from outside the traditional decision-making calculus. 
As the election approaches, un-modeled factors might 
affect Republican senators’ choices. Swing-state senators 
may sense potential electoral advantage from casting a vote 
against partisan gridlock; or, all senators might concede 
that the post-election environment will be worse than the 
status quo, if Hillary Clinton is the likely victor and if she 
is likely to have long coattails. The fact that 10 of the 17 
Republican senators listed in Table 2 are up for re-election 
in 2016 might significantly reshape their voting calculus in 
a predictable yet unprecedented way.
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Notes
 1. Ironically, three of the next four nominees were defeated; see 
Silverstein (2007).
 2. The “same-party” dummy variable is coded equal to 1 if the 
senator belongs to the same party as the president, and coded 
equal to 0 otherwise.
 3. Our final measure is a nominee’s lack of qualifications, cal-
culated by subtracting Segal and Cover’s (1989) qualifica-
tion score from 1.
 4. The measure of “ideological distance” is calculated by squar-
ing the difference between each nominee’s and each senator’s 
Common Space DW-NOMINATE scores. To place the nomi-
nee and senators on the same scale, we regress the nominating 
president’s Common Space score on the nominee’s Segal–
Cover score whenever the president’s party held the Senate 
majority. Next, we use the regression coefficients to predict 
nominees’ Common Space scores using the linear equation: 
Common Space score = .43457 – .89968(Segal–Cover score). 
Due to concerns about the scaling of the first dimension during 
the “Conservative Coalition” years, we replicated the analysis 
in Table 1 using ideal point estimates generated by Michael 
Bailey. With the exception of consistently smaller coefficients 
for ideology, due to a wider scale of ideal points, our results were 
largely robust. An appendix provides a comparison of models, 
with discussion. It is available online at: http://uh.academia.
edu/ScottBasinger/Research-on-Judicial-Appointments.
 5. De Marchi et al. opine: “The relative merits of competing 
theories about the data-generating process should be deter-
mined by an out-of-sample comparison of model fit” (2004: 
372). Out-of-sample validation is a defense against overfit-
ting; see DeMarchi (2005).
 6. Thirty-one Republicans voted against Sotomayor, while nine 
Republicans voted for her confirmation; all 57 Democrats 
plus two Independents voted for Sotomayor’s confirmation. 
36 Republicans and one Democrat voted against Kagan, while 
five Republicans voted for her confirmation; 56 Democrats 
plus two Independents voted for Kagan’s confirmation.
 7. Similarly, Basinger and Mak (2010) incorporated mean party 
loyalty into an analysis of obstruction of federal judicial 
nominees at the district and circuit court levels.
 8. We compute average party loyalty for each Congress, averag-
ing senators’ raw party loyalty scores; we then mean-center 
average party loyalty by subtracting 78.18.
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 9. We compute relative party loyalty for each senator by sub-
tracting average party loyalty in that Congress from the sena-
tor’s raw party loyalty score.
10. Although Angus King and Bernard Sanders are officially 
Independents, we group them with Democrats for calculat-
ing average and relative party loyalty.
11. The party loyalty model’s out-of-sample forecasts have an 
average forecasting error of five yea/nay votes for each con-
firmation. Out-of-sample forecasts failed to accurately pre-
dict the outcomes of three nominations (Haynsworth, Bork, 
and Thomas) of the 43 in the sample.
12. This prediction conflicts directly with the analysis of 
Cameron et al. (2013) as highlighted by Cameron and 
Kastellec (2016). The latter claim that hypothetical nomi-
nees who are ideologically more conservative than Breyer 
but more liberal than Kennedy could earn in excess of 50 
votes in the current Senate; ideological clones of Earl Warren 
or Potter Stewart should earn in excess of 60 votes according 
to their model.
13. See Johnson and Roberts (2004).
14. Another factor that we must leave to the error term is public 
opinion on the nominee. Research by Kastellec et al. (2010) 
has tied senators’ votes to public opinion, showing that sena-
tors are more likely to vote for a nominee—holding all other 
factors in the Segal model constant—when voters in their 
own state view the nominee more favorably. Survey data on 
support for Merrick Garland are not presently available.
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